In 1997, Indonesia was hit by an economic crisis. Itforced the government to turn to the IMF and to adopt an economic recovery and reform programme, including in trade. This paper focuses on Indonesia 's trade policies after the economic crisis. The paper examines the policy trends towards protection and addresses the issues of competitiveness. It also discusses Indonesia's positions in the WTO and Doha Round, and analyses its policies on and involvement in free trade agreements (FTAs), which have recently proliferated in the Asia-Pacific region. The paper concludes that FTAs have become an element of Indonesia 's international economic diplomacy. However, Indonesia will negotiate FTAs only with a few major trading partners, and the policy is aimed at producing high quality agreements.
I. Introduction
The performance of the Indonesian economy before the economic crisis of 1997-98 was rather remarkable. Structural transformation had taken place in agriculture, manufacturing, and also the utilities and services sectors. The period from the mid-1960s to 1980s was a notable one in Indonesian economic history.
In the 1980s, the economy was faced with various problems. The weakened oil prices in the early 1980s significantly reduced export earnings and budget revenues. The large decline in oil prices severely affected Indonesia's balance of payments. During 1980-85, the economy grew by 3.7 per cent per annum, which was much slower than the 7.5 per cent during the period 1975-80. In response to this situation the Indonesian Government undertook some adjustment programmes to increase economic efficiency, altering its trade regime to become more outward-looking, and accorded high priority to develop non-oil and gas (NOG) exports. No less than twenty-four packages of economic reforms were introduced from 1983 to 1995, aimed at increasing economic efficiency and encouraging investment as well as non-oil exports. Along with this change in orientation, the government changed its investment policy from one of control to that of promotion. In addition, various trade reforms were introduced to improve the trade and industrial policy regimes. The Indonesian trade regime prior to the mid-1980s was relatively protected. However, from 1985 when trade reform was embarked upon, the levels of protection had declined, and Indonesia entered into an era of export orientation. These developments accentuated the historical shift from import substitution to export orientation, particularly in the manufacturing sector. These various measures revived the economy, and during 1985-90 the annual rate of growth of GDP was 6.3 per cent.
In 1997, Indonesia was hit by the economic crisis. This forced the government to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for aid and to adopt an economic recovery and reform programme, including those in trade. This paper focuses on Indonesia's trade policies after the economic crisis. The next section examines the policy trends towards protection and addresses the issues of competitiveness. Section III briefly discusses Indonesia's positions in the WTO and Doha Round, while section IV analyses its policies on and involvement in free trade agreements (FTAs), which have recently proliferated in the Asia-Pacific region, and concludes the paper.
II. Policy Trends

1 Pattern of Trade
In 2001 the key markets for Indonesia's non-oil exports were the developing East Asian countries (accounting for 26 per cent), Japan (15 per cent), and the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) (16 per cent) , mainly the United States. It is worth noting that exports to East Asia increased significantly from 15 per cent in 1990 to 26 per cent in 2001. This was in large part due to an increase in exports to other ASEAN countries, whose share doubled to 16 per cent of the total non-oil exports. Brenton and Ikezuki (2003) observed that Indonesia's manufacturing exports to non-OECD countries in 1990 were 41 per cent of those to OECD countries. This ratio has risen significantly to around 80 per cent in 2001. This finding suggests that developing countries are becoming important markets for Indonesia. It is interesting to note that Indonesia has been quite successful in competing in developing countries. Its market share has been increasing throughout the last decade, thus making developing countries as important as OECD countries as the destination of Indonesia's exports.
This trend can be seen in Figure 1 .' This trend is in contrast to China's trade pattern, where developed countries are becoming more important as export destination. This could suggest that, in the future, Indonesia should consider targeting its exports to the developing economies. In this regard, it should be noted that, in general, developing countries have higher levels of tariff than developed countries. Indonesia already has a much lower tariff than developing countries in general. This further suggests that it is in Indonesia's interest to see that tariffs in developing countries are being reduced. Indonesian exports could be attributed to weak global economic demand after the September 11 attacks. However, the industrial production index started to pick up in the first half of 2003: textile, leather, and footwear products grew by 7.5 per cent, whereas wood products grew by 6.9 per cent. One of the possible explanations for this improvement was the shift of demand from some East Asian countries to Indonesia due to SARS. This was definitely the case for garments.2 From January to July 2003 exports of textiles grew by more than 5 per cent.
Nevertheless, serious problems persist, and they appear to be systemic. The slowdown of Indonesian exports can be attributed to supply problems, including the higher cost of doing business, weak industrial relations policy, hikes in minimum wages, and poor infrastructure conditions. These factors have become a major constraint to the rapid growth of exports. Table 1 shows that from 1985 to 2001 the growth of exports was driven by the increase of market share (competitiveness factor), but from 1995 to 2001 the source of growth was dominated by demand factors. In-depth observation shows that the majority of Indonesian exports experienced a decline in market share, except for palm oil, printing and writing paper, and electronics. Table 2 shows the trends in Indonesian major manufacturing products' specialization based on The Geographic Destination of Indonesia and China Exports the Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA): From 1985 to 1995, all of these products experienced an increase in RCA (arrows pointing from left to right). However, from 1995 However, from -2001 the RCA of some of these products, including plywood, textiles, footwear, and garments, showed a declining trend (arrows pointing from right to left). These figures reinforce the earlier suggestion that export growth was mainly driven by the supply side (competitiveness) rather than the demand side from 1985 to 1995, but this was no longer the case from 1995 to 2001. This suggests that the main obstacles to Indonesian export growth mainly stem from the supply side.
To make things worse, this declining competitiveness was accompanied by creeping protectionism. Protectionism should not be the answer to the difficulties in making progress at the multilateral level (for example, in the WTO), and does not provide a sustainable basis for growth.
While there is no conclusive relationship between trade openness and growth in many countries, there is also no evidence that trade protection is systematically associated with high economic growth (Rodrik 2002) . This is particularly true for Indonesia. Protectionist policies will undermine the current open trade regime that has served Indonesia so well in the past (Aswicahyono 1998; Basri 2001; Hill 1996) . The continuing signs of increasing protectionism imply that the Indonesian Government has resorted to trade policy to overcome inefficiencies in the supply side. The government has not addressed the problem of lagging productivity through measures to increase efficiency. Instead, it tends to preserve the inefficient industries by increasing protectionism. The government has issued various ad hoc trade policies, including protectionist measures in a number of sectors. From 2001, protectionism has been on the rise, as evident in the increase in tariffs on wheat flour and trade regulations and licensing (tata niaga) on textiles, steel, sugar, and clove. It is worth noting that the most common instrument of protection is non-tariff barriers, which fall directly under the authority of the Ministry of Trade and Industry (Ray 2003) . In Thailand, with a share of 10.5 per cent.
II.3 Trade Reform during the Economic Crisis
In November 1997, the IMF entered the picture following various unsuccessful attempts by the Indonesian Government to stabilize the rupiah. Unlike in Thailand and other previous IMF packages, the Indonesian agreement includes trade reform, which was normally beyond the mandate of the IMF (Soesastro and Basri 1998) . As pointed out by Soesastro and Basri (1998) , the structural adjustment programme was to include a gradual specifically for cement and paper, and the plywood cartels were dissolved. In the investment sector, formal and informal barriers to investment in palm oil plantation were removed in February 1998, and this was followed by removing all restrictions on investment in wholesale and retail trade. Internal and external trade restrictions in cement were eliminated, allowing traders to buy and distribute all cement brands in all provinces and to export under the General Exporter licence.
In addition, the government also discontinued special tax, customs, and credit privileges to the National Car (Timor) project. Moreover, import restrictions on all new used ships were abolished. Indonesia has since become a relatively open economy and deserves much credit for its unilateral liberalization. Figure 2 shows that average tariff has declined, and in line with longstanding sectoral support, the highest tariffs apply mainly to alcoholic beverages and completely built-up motor vehicles. Figure 3 shows the average tariffs for some countries including Indonesia, illustrating the significant reduction from 1985 to 1999.4 In fact, in 1999 the average tariff in Indonesia was lower than that in Thailand and China.5 The overall average applied MFN tariff was 7.2 per cent (2002), down from 9.5 per cent in 1998. For industrial products, the average tariff was 7 per cent, and for agricultural products it was 8.4 per cent. 
The Structure of Trade Protection
Post-crisis As shown below, the effective/nominal rate of protection (ERP/NRP) in the manufacturing sector was much higher than in the agriculture sector in 2000. Nominally, the average rate of protection in the manufacturing sector was 11.45 per cent, while the average effective rate of protection could reach 25.72 per cent. The rate of protection in this sector was also higher than the rate of protection in all IO Although the calculation of ERP shows that the manufacturing sector has a relatively higher protection rate than the agriculture sector, it is too early to state that those who gain most from protection are capital owners. This is because most non-tariff barriers in the manufacturing sector have been converted into tariff barriers since 1995.
In the agriculture sector, non-tariff barriers still prevail, and these are not included in the calculation of the rate of protection in this study. For instance, trade liberalization as committed to in the WTO or AFTA gives priority to strengthening domestic sectors. Thus, local producers in the agriculture sector are still given protection in terms of non-tariff barriers like subsidies, import quotas, and other production improvements for certain commodities, like sugar and rice. Note: * Weight average based on sectors.
Creeping Protectionism
There is clear evidence that in the past crony capitalists and interest groups have been the major obstacles to trade liberalization in Indonesia (Basri 2001 ). In view of the importance of exports and their contribution to the Indonesian economy, and the huge depreciation of the real exchange rate after the economic crisis of 1997-98, it is less likely that Indonesia will return to high trade protection in the future. In addition, owing to the IMF agreement following the economic crisis in 1997, much of the trade protection has been Nevertheless, it would be imprudent to conclude that pressures for trade protection will subside. While it is true that the economic crisis has forced Indonesia to further liberalize its economy, it should also be remembered that liberalization has also been blamed as the main cause of the crisis. In addition, resistance to market reform from protectionist groups cannot be underestimated. These groups are still prevalent and hold some key positions both in the government and in the business sector. They can create obstacles to further trade liberalization.
Although the downfall of Soeharto in May 1998 has brought about a major change of the political setting towards a more democratic system, this does not mean patrimonialism or rent-seeking activities have been eliminated completely. Patron-client relationships are still strong, and the increasing role of extra-state actors has enabled various interest groups to organize lobbies for trade protection as shown in the case of wheat flour. The rhetoric of agricultural protectionism, for example, is to protect poor rural farmers, but in reality it protects politically powerful rent-seeking groups. Basri, Maddaremeng, and Nuridzki (2004) show that there is a statistical evidence that trade protection was mostly given to the high capital-intensive sector. This study also finds that there is no statistical evidence that trade protection has been given to protect the sector which has low wages and salaries. In other words there is no evidence that protection protects the poor. Contrary to the argument that protection helps the poor or labour, this study shows that the capitalists are the one who benefited from trade protection in Indonesia.
The tug of war between the pro-and anti-trade reform groups can be expected to continue and to involve extremely complex bargaining and coalition between rent-seekers, interest groups, and various government agencies. This is evident since 2001 as new protectionism began to creep in. Table 4 lists some trade policies that show this trend. In the case of lubricant oils, imports can be undertaken only by producer importers and not by general importers. The government also imposed As for Indonesia, around 93 per cent tariff lines are subject to bound tariffs and the simple average bound rate is 39 per cent. In fact, simple average for bound tariffs remains high for developing countries relative to developed countries. In manufacturing (non-agricultural products), the market access to OECD countries is marked by low average tariffs both in the United States and EU, but with relative high dispersion in tariffs. It is worth noting that the non-agriculture products that Indonesia exports to both the United States and the EU are currently concentrated in aboveaverage duty products, making the weighted average of tariffs applied to Indonesia higher than the simple average in these markets. Average tariffs in developing countries are considerably higher, and average bound tariffs are even higher.
It is important to note that 73 per cent of Indonesian exports to Japan enter duty-free, but only one-third of Indonesian exports to the EU and the United States face zero most favoured nation (MFN) duties. In addition, almost all exports to developing countries are dutiable. More than 50 per cent of the top fifteen products exported to the EU are subject to zero MFN duties. These products account for around 20 per cent of the total non-agricultural product exports to the EU.
However, it is worth noting that the main dutiable products of interest to Indonesia, including footwear and wood products, are excluded from the EU preferences (under GSP).
As for the United States, seven of the main products exported to that country that are subject to zero duties account for around 20 per cent of the total non-agricultural product exports to the United States. Moreover, none of the main dutiable products exported by Indonesia to the United States, such as wood products, clothing, and footwear, are eligible for preferences and therefore pay the full MFN duties. These duties vary and can be very high, being over 16 per cent for footwear and as much as 27.5 per cent for certain clothing products. This suggests that the losses from the erosion of preferences will be very small relative to the gains from MFN tariff reductions on current exports since major Indonesia's exports to the United States and EU are excluded from preferences.
In the case of Japan, nine of the main NOG products are subject to zero MFN. In Japan, the main products that Indonesia currently exports have low tariffs, with most duties being less than 5 per cent. It is interesting to note that clothing is not a main export product to Japan.
The unweighted average tariffs are much higher in developing countries. Given that developing countries are now almost as important as developed countries for Indonesian manufacturing exports, the issue of the base tariffs from which tariff cuts by developing countries are made is of relevance to Indonesia both as an exporter and an importer. Since the average tariff in Indonesia is already relatively low, the further reduction of tariffs by using the Chairman's formula will reduce the tariffs by a smaller percentage compared with other developing countries. Thus if Indonesia would like to gain market access in developing countries, Indonesia has to choose a formula which results in significant reduction of tariffs in other developing countries. For Indonesia, as for other developing countries, the key issue is whether tariff cuts should be made to bound or to applied rates. If the tariff cut is made to bound rates, it will give little impact to trade liberalization because the bound rates are substantially above the average of currently applied rates. However, if the tariff cut is made to applied tariff Indonesia will gain more.
In fact, the Indonesian Government accepts tariff reduction so long as it is does not harm domestic industries. This argument is ambiguous and potentially reinforces protectionist tendencies. In addition, there is a strong view from the Ministry of Trade and Industry for the need to adopt a "picking winners" strategy. This view gives rise to creeping protectionism and rent-seeking activities. introduced a regulatory framework for safeguard measures, which take the form of higher import duties applied initially for a period of six months and can be extended to up to four years depending on the findings of investigation. The implementation was postponed in 2003 because the institutional framework had not yet been set. Indonesia is in favour of contingency measures, including safeguards, and supports the inclusion of safeguards issue in the negotiations on trade in services. However, implementing safeguards in services is a very complicated matter.
7/7.5 Subsidies
Indonesia also supports the agreement on subsidies and countervailing measures by including the members that are listed therein until their GNP per capita reaches $1,000 (in constant dollar 1990). In fact, for three consecutive years (1998-2001) Indonesia's GNP per capita had fallen to below $1,000 due to the crisis. Nevertheless, fiscal constraints made it difficult for the Indonesian Government to apply such measures.
Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)
Indonesia and other developing countries want to see the negotiations on TRIPs and Public Health issues to be completed soon. This is in line with their stand that TRIPs and Public Health will help developing countries provide affordable medicines for the people. In amending the TRIPs agreement, Indonesia is sympathetic to the view of giving a fair chance to all members to review and convey their problems and objections against the existing temporary solution.
/77. 7 New Issues
In line with the progress in Cancun, Indonesia is of the view that competition policy, government procurement, and investment should not be included in the WTO agenda and that trade facilitation should be discussed further. Indonesia believes that improvement in trade facilitation will help increase trade flows. Indonesia also believes that this issue can be best implemented unilaterally and autonomously by way of commitment at the regional level, along with technical assistance provided through bilateral assistance and multilateral institutions.
IV. Policy Implications and the Way Ahead Basri and Hill (2004) argued that trade liberalization in the mid-1980s had been successful due to the adequate real exchange rate depreciation and the adverse terms of trade shocks in the collapse in the oil price. Both factors increased exports and indirectly protect domestic goods from imports, leading to less pressure for import protection. This situation has changed. The rupiah real exchange rate has appreciated by about 60 per cent compared with 1998. In addition the government has raised the minimum wage in 1999. Corruption is pervasive and the high-cost economy has re-emerged. As discussed earlier, all of these have led to an erosion of Indonesia's manufacturing sector competitiveness. This will in turn increase the demand for protection. With regard to agreement with Indonesia's major economic partners, Japan is first on the list. There are still obstacles to begin a process with the United States because certain pre-conditions have been demanded by the U.S. side. It seems that the United States wants to see a resolution on some trade disputes (on chicken legs, optical disks, for example) before the negotiation can begin so that they cannot be used by Indonesia in making concessions.
The proposal to establish an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between Indonesia and Japan was first aired in the Joint Announcement between President Megawati and Prime Minister Some progress is evident in terms of coverage and attention. The Indonesian side in the meeting consisted of about sixty persons from various government departments, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and research institutes. This suggests the greater interest, but also the seriousness on the part of the government and its intention to involve wider stakeholders in the process.
What emanates from the meeting was the need on both sides to be able to clearly articulate how each sees the benefits (and costs) of the EPA. It Japan's foreign direct investment (FDI) to Indonesia is likely to increase if the EPA enhances the business climate, and Indonesia will in turn benefit from industrial restructuring that results from reforms undertaken within the framework of the agreement (and beyond).
In addition, intensified exchanges on the above areas of common interest amount to a "soft negotiation" already. While the exchanges are seen as non-binding, they help improve common understanding and narrow down disagreements. When the formal negotiations begin, both sides will already have a better feel for each other. This could result in a rather speedy negotiation.
The process that begins with preparatory meetings and Joint Study Group meetings is one that is useful and necessary for the Indonesian side. In particular, this is so because this process with Japan is the first for Indonesia. The major challenge for the Indonesian side is to co-ordinate among the different ministries and agencies, and to develop a common language, understanding, and strategy. It may well be that before the end of the year an agreement could be reached to start with the official negotiations, and that by the end of 2006 both sides will be able to produce a draft EPA.
A main challenge for Indonesian negotiators is that they will begin this exercise by negotiating with the most important, but also the most difficult, countries -Japan and the United States. If they can do this right the pay-offs will be substantial. But the risks are also very great. Indonesia can draw on some of the agreements that have been concluded by Singapore and Thailand (with Japan, the United States, and Australia). It should be noted, however, that the Singapore-Japan agreement largely left out agriculture, which will be an important component in an agreement between Indonesia and Japan. The Singapore-U.S. agreement largely deals with sectors and areas beyond goods trade that Indonesia may be least prepared to address.
Thus the learning process will be the most important aspect of the negotiations. In fact some kind of facilitation or technical assistance by Japan or the United States should be built into the negotiating process itself.
As a member of ASEAN, Indonesia is also a party in the ASEAN-China FTA. Indonesia did not play an active role during the ASEAN-China FTA negotiations. It is also not a leading party in ASEAN's negotiations with Japan, India, Korea, and the CER (Closer Economic Relations between Australia and New Zealand).
In the domestic arena, immediate efforts need to be made to come up with a clear understanding as to which sectors are likely to gain most from the FTAs and which sectors will be adversely affected by the FTAs. The former is necessary so that Indonesia can focus its efforts on those areas. The latter is important so that ways could be devised to lessen the likely negative impact. Domestic adjustments and reforms will have to be undertaken. As suggested before, bilateral or regional FTAs can help promote domestic reforms. See Scollay (2004) for details on this framework in the APEC context.
